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I.

INTRODUCTION

An individual debtor who successfully completes a bankruptcy case
receives a discharge of the debtor's unpaid debts at the conclusion of bankruptcy

*

Professor, Stetson University College of Law.

385

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

386

[Vol. 124

or upon confirmation of the debtor's bankruptcy plan.' However, the Bankruptcy
Code limits the ability of the debtor to receive a discharge of certain debts.
Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code outlines most of those exceptions to
discharge, 2 and those exceptions limit discharge in order to protect special
populations of creditors 3 or punish a debtor for poor behavior in incurring the

debt. 4
Section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code denies discharge of prepetition debt "to the extent obtained by" fraud.5 This provision suggests that the
mere existence of fraud does not render debt nondischargeable. Instead, the
inquiry requires a determination of the extent to which the debt resulted from
pre-petition fraud committed by the debtor.6 The Bankruptcy Code does not
define the elements of fraud; instead, it leaves the question of what constitutes
fraud to various state laws.7 The courts interpreting this provision generally
require several elements to be met to render debt nondischargeable fraud debt,
including the existence of a debt resulting from fraud that benefits the debtor.8
Section 523 makes clear that the existence of fraud alone does not make a debt
nondischargeable. Rather, the existence of state-law fraud, combined with a
causal element between how the debt arises and the resulting benefit to the
debtor, creates fraud nondischargeability in a bankruptcy case. Unfortunately,
the causal connections and the interpretation of the phrase "to the extent obtained
by" provide significant challenges for the courts in determining when a debtor's
fraud leads to nondischargeability of a debt. This article seeks to consider several
situations in which the causal connection poses such difficulty in order to
develop a uniform application of § 523(a)(2)'s nondischargeability for fraud

See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 727(a), 1141(d)(1)(A), 1192, 1228(a), 1328(a) (West 2021).
In addition to specific discharge exceptions outlined in § 523, the Code denies all discharge
to debtors who have engaged in particularly egregious behaviors that impact the ability to carry
forth the bankruptcy case. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 727 (2)-(7) (denying discharge for, inter alia,
2

concealment of assets, being untruthful in the case, and refusal to obey court orders).

3
See, e.g., id. § 523(a)(1) (nondischargeability of certain tax obligations, even if return was
filed); id. § 523(a)(5) (nondischargeability of domestic support obligations, including alimony,
child support, and maintenance); id. § 523(a)(15) (nondischargeability of property settlements in
divorce proceedings).
4
See, e.g., id. § 523(a)(4) (nondischargeability for defalcation in a fiduciary capacity); id. §
523(a)(6) (nondischargeability for willful and malicious injury); id. § 523(a)(9)
(nondischargeability for injuries associated with driving under the influence).

5

Id. § 523(a)(2).

6

Id.

See, e.g., Husky Int'l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 832 F.3d 560, 569 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting that
whether fraud exists falls within Texas state law). The Code also includes "false pretenses" and
"false representation[s]" as part of the fraud nondischargeability provision. 11 U.S.C.A. §
523(a)(2)(A).
8
In re Torres-Montoya, 580 B.R. 556, 563 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2017).
7
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claims in light of the Supreme Court's 2016 opinion in Husky International
Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz.9
II.

EXCEPTIONS TO DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION

523(A)(2)
An individual debtor who successfully completes a bankruptcy case
receives a discharge of most of the debtor's unpaid debts at the conclusion of
bankruptcy. Section 523 provides for exceptions to the debtor's discharge,
including nondischargeability for debts resulting from fraud: "(a) A
discharge ... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt ... (2) for
money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to
the extent obtained by ... (A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual
fraud."10
Congress enacted § 523 as part of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, but the
concept of nondischargeability for fraud debt existed in the Code's predecessor,
Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2)." The Code modified the Act provision, adding "actual
fraud" as a basis for nondischargeability.12 The legislative history notes the
purpose of the changes implemented in the Code:
Section 523(a)(2) likewise represents a compromise between the
position taken in the House bill and the Senate amendment with
respect to the false financial statement exception to discharge.
In order to clarify that a "renewal of credit" includes a
"refinancing of credit," explicit reference to a refinancing of
credit is made in the preamble to section 523(a)(2). A renewal
of credit or refinancing of credit that was obtained by a false
financial statement within the terms of section 523(a)(2) is
nondischargeable. However, each of the provisions of section
523(a)(2) must be proved. Thus, under section 523(a)(2)(A) a
creditor must prove that the debt was obtained by false
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a
statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial
condition. Subparagraph (A) is intended to codify current case

law e.g., Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704 (1887) [24 L. Ed. 586],

9

10
"

578 U.S. 356 (2016).
11 U.S.C.A § 523(a)(2) (emphasis added).
For more discussion of the legislative history of 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(A) before the

Bankruptcy Act, see David Koha, When FraudResults in a NondischargeableDebt: The Scope of
11 U.S. C.A. § 523(a)(2)(A) After Husky International Electronics v. Ritz, 2017 ANN. SURv. BANKR.

L. 13 (2017).
12
See S. REP. No. 95-989; see also H.R REP. No. 95-595.
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which interprets "fraud" to mean actual or positive fraud rather
than fraud implied in law. 13
The legislative statement indicates several things: (1) even without fraud
in the initial incurrence of debt, fraud in refinancing suffices for
nondischargeability when it involves false financial statements, (2) actual fraud
does not include implied fraud situations, and (3) to render a debt
nondischargeable under this section, the impacted creditor must show both fraud
and that the fraud caused the indebtedness.14 The third element-that the debt
was "obtained by" fraud-leads to much debate among the courts considering
that causal requirement.
While the language of the statute currently provides for
nondischargeability of debt "to the extent obtained by" fraud, when first adopted
in 1978, the language denied discharge "for obtaining money, property, services
or an extension, renewal, or refinance of credit, by-(A) false pretenses, a false
representation, or actual fraud.""5 Part of this change appears to be relatively
minor-changing "obtaining" money or property by fraud to money or property
"obtained by" fraud. But that change from the active tense to the passive tense
allows the courts to deny discharge even for parties who did not promulgate the
fraud or receive the benefits of that fraud by no longer suggesting that the party
being denied discharge must actively engage in the action of obtaining something
through fraud. The change also added the modifier "to the extent" to qualify what
was obtained, suggesting a limitation on the nondischargeability provision.
Simply having something obtained through someone's fraud alone may not
necessarily create nondischargeability. But the reasons for the change in
language from the affirmative act of "obtaining money ... by ... fraud" to the
passive "to the extent obtained by ... fraud" and the impact of those changes
creates more uncertainty given the wide variety of situations falling into the
category of fraud.
III.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON WHAT CONSTITUTES NONDISCHARGEABLE FRAUD

This section will examine the major Supreme Court decisions on the
topic of what constitutes non-dischargeable fraud. First, this section will examine
Husky International Electronics Inc., v. Ritz, a case in which the Supreme Court
considered what constitutes non-dischargeable fraud under § 523(a)(2)'s
exception to dischargeability. Second, this section will examine Cohen v. de la
Cruz, a case in which the Supreme Court applied a broad construction to §
523(a)(2), concluding that it prevents the discharge of any debt respecting

13

See Bankruptcy Code, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).

14

Id.

The language was amended to its current version in 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 454, 98
Stat. 333 (1984).
15
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money, property, or services, or credit. Finally, this section will discuss Archer
v. Warner, in which the Court also adopted a broad construction of the "obtained
by" language in § 523(a)(2).
A. Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz
In 2016, the Supreme Court considered what constitutes nondischargeable fraud under § 523(a)(2) in Husky InternationalElectronics, Inc. v.
Ritz.1 6 The debtor, Ritz, served as a director and partial owner of Chrysalis
Manufacturing Corporation, which purchased electronics from Husky
International on credit.' 7 While indebted to Husky International, Ritz used his
control of Chrysalis to deplete company resources that could have paid the
company's debts.1 8 Husky International sued Ritz, arguing that Ritz's control of
9
the company made him liable for the company's debts,1 and then asked the
bankruptcy court to declare the resulting liability nondischargeable as
fraudulently incurred debt. 20 The primary issue considered by the Court involved
whether § 523(a)(2)(A)'s fraud nondischargeability exception includes "forms
of fraud, like fraudulent conveyance schemes, that can be effected without a false
22
representation." 21 Focusing on the language of the nondischargeability statute
and common law definitions of fraud,23 the Court refused to require a false
24
statement to find nondischargeable fraud.
The Court then addressed the impact of section (a)(2)'s "obtained by"
language. The debtor clearly committed a fraudulent act by transferring assets
out of Chrysalis that could have been used to pay creditors, a form of fraudulent

16

See Husky Int'l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 578 U.S. 356 (2016).

17

Id. at 357-58.

18

Id.

19

After being remanded by the Supreme Court and eventually making its way back to the

bankruptcy court, the debtor was found to be liable for Chrysalis's debt by piercing the corporate
veil. In re Ritz, 567 B.R. 715 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2017).

Husky, 578 U.S. at 357-58.
Id. at 359-60.
22
Id. (citing Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 35(a)(2) (Supp. II 1976)); Bankruptcy Reform
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2590 (1978); 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(A) (West 2021)). Under
the Bankruptcy Act, debtors could not discharge debts based on "false pretenses or false
representations." Bankruptcy Code, enacted in 1978, included "actual fraud," suggesting that
20
21

actual fraud means something other than simply false pretenses or false representations by the
debtor.
23
The Court had previously defined "actual" fraud to "denote any fraud that 'involv[es] moral

turpitude or intentional wrong."' Id. at 360-61 (citing Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69 (1995); Neal
v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1878)) (noting that "from the beginning of English bankruptcy practice,
courts and legislatures have used the term 'fraud' to describe a debtor's transfer of assets that, like

Ritz's scheme, impairs a creditor's ability to collect the debt").
24
Id. at 362-63.
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conveyance.2 ' The debtor argued that he did not "obtain" anything by the
fraudulent conveyances. The Court rejected that argument and held that "any
debts 'traceable to' the fraudulent conveyance . .. will be nondischargeable." 26
This provides a relatively low threshold of causality-simply requiring a
connection between the existence of fraud and the debt owed to the creditor. The
Court likewise rejected the debtor's argument that the initial obligation-the debt
owed by Chrysalis to Husky International-must result from fraud, instead
favoring an interpretation that allowed later fraud to serve as the basis for
nondischargeability even though the debt existed regardless of the fraud. 27 In
short, the majority opinion provides a broad construction of the phrase "obtained
by," indicating that the phrase does not require that the initial debt be obtained
by fraud and requiring a minimal link between the existence of fraud and the debt
owed to the victim of that fraud.
In his dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas focused on the "obtained by"
language and suggested a more narrow reading of the term. 28 Justice Thomas
found that the "obtained by" language of § 523(a)(2) mandates that the fraud lead
to the payment obligation-the section only provides for nondischargeability if
the fraud "caused the creditor to enter into a transaction with the debtor." 2 9 In the
case at hand, the initial debt occurred because Husky International sold
electronics on credit and did not involve any fraud on Chrysalis's (or even Ritz's)
part.30 The majority dismissed the dissent's conclusion, noting that:
It is of course true that the transferor does not "obtai[n]" debts
in a fraudulent conveyance. But the recipient of the transferwho, with the requisite intent, also commits fraud-can
"obtai[n]" assets "by" his or her participation in the fraud.3 1

26

Id. at 359.
Id. at 365.

27

Id. at 365-66.

25

Id. at 368-69 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 325 (2003)
(citing Field, 516 U.S. at 61, 64) (requiring "a causal nexus between the fraud and the debt")).
28

29

Id. ("Section 523(a)(2)(A) applies only when the fraudulent conduct occurs at the inception
of the debt, i.e., when the debtor commits a fraudulent act to induce the creditor to part with his
money, property, services, or credit.") (emphasis in original).
3

Id. at 364-65 (majority opinion).

31
Id. (citing McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 2000)). At least one commentator
has noted that this language poses the risk that recipient of a fraudulent transfer, whose debt exists
only because of the fraud, may face nondischargeability of its repayment obligation while the

transferor, whose debt predates the fraud, would be allowed to discharge any obligation to the same
creditor. See Koha, supra note 11, at Part IV.B.1 ("If the Fourth Circuit's decision in Rountree is
correct, the debtor must obtain money, property, services or credit as a result of the fraud.
Transferring money or property to someone else does not seem to meet this requirement" and
"transferee becomes subject to § 523(a)(2)(A), but absent the unique type of situation found in
Husky, the transferor will not incur a nondischargeable debt"). This presents a problem because in

a fraudulent transfer based on intent to "hinder, delay, or defraud," it is the transferor's intent that
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The majority also dismissed Justice Thomas's causal link between the
fraud and incurrence of the debt as being based in caselaw on a different issue
because the cases used to interpret the requirement of reliance required when
fraud occurs through the making of a false statement. 2 The Supreme Court did,
indeed, require reliance on the part of the creditor for fraud nondischargeability
in Fieldv. Mans,3 but that case involved a false statement made by the debtor to
the creditor. 34
B. Cohen v. de la Cruz
Even before the Husky decision, the Supreme Court gave a broad
construction of § 523(a)(2)'s "obtained by" language in several other cases. In
Cohen v. de la Cruz, the local government ordered Cohen, a landlord, to refund
excess rents paid by tenants; Cohen instead filed for bankruptcy protection. 3
The tenants sought nondischargeability, arguing that the excessive rents
36
constituted payments obtained by Cohen through fraud. The primary issue
before the Supreme Court involved the punitive damages awarded by the
Bankruptcy Court for the fraudulent behavior and whether those punitive
damages constitute an obligation "obtained by" the debtor's fraud. 37 Previously,
some courts held that "[p]unitive damages do not constitute a benefit to a debtor
who has engaged in fraud nor do they represent a loss to a creditor. Rather,
punitive damages are 'awarded as an example to others or as a penalty or by way

makes the situation fraudulent. 11. U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(1)(A) (West 2021). Thus, while the transferee
might be aware of or complicit in the fraud, the transferee could be relatively innocent. But the
transferor will never lack intent. See also 11 U.S.C.A. § 550(b) (allowing subsequent good-faith
transferees to avoid liability for the transfer, but not allowing same for initial transferee regardless

of good faith).
See Husky, 578 U.S. at 364-66. See also Hon. Deborah L. Thorne & Brett Newman, What's
Next After Husky v. Ritz: Has Pandora'sBox Been Opened?, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 21 (2016)
(discussing "obtained by" requirement as an "unresolved question[ ]").
32

33

516 U.S. 59, 66 (1995) ("[S]ome degree of reliance is required to satisfy the element of

causation.").

34

See 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(A). Section 523(a) provides for nondischargeability "for

money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained
by ... a false representation." In such a case, it is clear that the money or credit had to be obtained
through the false representation. See also Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.

2549 (1978) ("Subparagraph (A) is mutually exclusive from subparagraph (B). Subparagraph (B)
pertains to the so-called false financial statement. In order for the debt to be nondischargeable, the
creditor must prove that the debt was obtained by the use of a statement in writing (i) that is

materially false; (ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition; (iii) on which the
creditor to whom the debtor is liable for obtaining money, property, services, or credit reasonably

relied; (iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to deceive.") (emphasis
added).
See Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 215 (1998).
35
36

Id.

37

Id. at 216.
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of punishment."' As a result, a debtor did not "obtain" an obligation to pay
punitive damages through the fraud, and those damages could be discharged even
if nondischargeability applied to the related compensatory damages. The Cohen
Court disagreed, concluding instead that "[t]he most straightforward reading of
§ 523(a)(2)(A) is that it prevents discharge of 'any debt' respecting 'money,
property, services, or ...
credit' that the debtor has fraudulently obtained,
including treble damages assessed on account of the fraud." 39 As the Court noted,
the treble damages qualify as a debt, 40 and the debt arose as a result of money
"obtained by" fraud-"[t]he phrase thereby makes clear that the share of money,
property, etc., that is obtained by fraud gives rise to a nondischargeable debt.
Once it is established that specific money or property has been obtained by fraud,
however, 'any debt' arising therefrom is excepted from discharge." 4' While
Husky and Cohen both provide broad interpretations of the "obtained by"
language, they can be distinguished. In Cohen, the debtor's initial obligation
existed as a result of fraud; in Husky, the fraud occurred after the initial debt
arose. Applying the Cohen standard that looks first to whether "it is established
that specific money or property has been obtained by fraud" would not
necessarily create nondischargeability in the Husky case because the debtor did
not obtain anything as a result of fraud. Thus, these two cases suggest broad
constructions of the obtained by language in two different ways: (1) per Cohen,
once the creditor proves the existence of fraud to incur debt, any other debts
resulting from that fraud face nondischargeability, and (2) per Husky, a creditor
must only demonstrate a link between the debt and fraud, even if that link postdates the debt being incurred because the debtor engages in fraud to prevent the
collection of that debt by the creditor.

38
Star Bank, N.A. v. Reveal (In re Reveal), 148 B.R. 288, 293 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) (citing
Palmer v. Levy (In re Levy), 951 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 985 (1992);
Haile v. McDonald (In re McDonald), 73 B.R. 877, 882 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987)).
39
Cohen, 523 U.S. at 218 (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(A)).

40
Id. ("A 'debt' is defined in the Code as 'liability on a claim,' § 101(12), a 'claim' is defined
in turn as a 'right to payment,' § 101(5)(A), and a 'right to payment,' we have said, 'is nothing
more nor less than an enforceable obligation."') (citing Pa. Dep't. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport,
495 U.S. 552 (1990)).
41

Id. Twelve years before the Cohen decision, a bankruptcy court considered a similar issue

in a case involving treble damages awarded to the government due to a violation of the Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962 (West 2021). See
McCullough v. Suter (In re Suter), 59 B.R. 944 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986). The Court held that the
punitive damages could be discharged, even though the compensatory damages clearly qualified
as nondischargeable fraud. While Cohen seems to overrule that result, the Suter court relied in part

on § 523(a)(7), which permitted discharge of non-compensatory damages owed to the government.
Id. at 947. Despite the Suter court's limitation on government-owed damages, other post-Cohen
courts have interpreted the Cohen decision as permitting nondischargeability of punitive damages
owed to a governmental entity. See, e.g., Colorado v. Wine (In re Wine), 558 B.R. 438 (Bankr. D.

Colo. 2016); Mouhtadi v. Shaikh (In re Shaikh), No. 16-02765-5-JNC, 2017 WL 4838746, at *89 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2017).
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C. Archer v. Warner
The Court also provided a broad construction of "obtained by" in its
2003 case, Archer v. Warner. 2 The Archer case involved the settlement of a
potential fraud claim before the alleged tortfeasor filed for bankruptcy
protection. 43 The debtor argued that the debt owed to the plaintiff constituted a
dischargeable contract claim, as settlement agreements constitute a contract, and
the debtor did not engage in any fraud in entering into the settlement contract.44
The Court disagreed, holding that but for the initial fraud-if the existence of
fraud could be shown by the plaintiff-the settlement obligation would not have
existed. 45 Thus, though the settlement did not arise out of fraud, fraud led to the
46
initial claim, which, in turn, led to the settlement. In so deciding, the Court
considered changes to the Bankruptcy Code that modified the language of
§523(a)(2)(A) to expand from "judgments" of fraud to "liabilities" resulting from
fraud.47 That modification "indicated that 'Congress intended the fullest possible
inquiry' to ensure that 'all debts arising out of fraud 'are excepted from
48
discharge,' no matter what their form." The Archer Court interpretation mirrors
the Cohen court interpretation-if the initial obligation existed because of fraud;
any further obligations that exist only as a result of that initial fraud also face
nondischargeability.
The combination of these cases provides a broad construction of the
49
"obtained by" language, one in which a causal connection between the debtor's

42

See Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003).

43

Id.

44

Id. at 318.
Id. at 322-23.
Id. at 320-21.

45
46

47
48

at 316-17.

Id. at 321.
Id. at 321 (citing Brown v. Felsen, 422 U.S. 127, 138 (1979)).

See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 67 (1995) (rejecting an interpretation of § 523(a)(2) that
49
would eliminate "any requirement to establish a causal connection between the misrepresentation
and the transfer of value or extension of credit"). Field involved the debtor's guaranty of debt owed
by his corporation and the giving of a mortgage to secure that debt. Id. at 61. The agreement
required the creditors' consent to sell the mortgaged property, but the debtor transferred the
property without noticing the creditors. Instead, the debtor asked the creditors to waive some of
their rights under the agreement (via a written letter) without disclosing the transfer. Id. at 62. The

§ 523(a)(2) nondischargeability issue arose when the creditors claimed fraud because the debtor
wrote about the property without disclosing the transfer. This essentially repeats the common law

requirement that the fraud caused damages. Id. at 62-63. The primary issue involved the standard
required to show reliance by the creditors on the debtor's statements in the letter. The reliance

element is implicit in the phrase "obtained by" as establishing a causal element. Id. at 66. The Court
determined that § 523(a)(2) requires a showing of justifiable reliance on the statements by the
creditors to establish nondischargeability. See id. at 74.
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perpetration of fraud and the existence of the debt5 0 suffices to create
nondischargeability. One can reconcile the differing broad interpretations of
Husky versus Cohen and Archer. While, in Husky, Chrysalis's debt did not arise
from the fraudulent conveyance, Ritz's debt did arise from that fraud. Ritz's
fraudulent conveyance actions led to piercing the corporate veil of his personal
liability to Husky." Thus, in each of the three cases, but for the debtor's fraud,
the debtor would not owe an obligation to the creditor. In Husky, Ritz's fraud
allowed piercing liability against him.52 In Cohen, a clear link exists between the
fraud and the incurrence of punitive liabilities-but for the fraud, the debtor
would not owe punitive damages. 53 In Archer, the potential fraud by the debtors
led to the initial claim against them and, ultimately, the settlement of that claim."
The Supreme Court's opinions taken together clearly provide that when the
debtor's fraud leads to the debtor's liability, that liability cannot be discharged.
IV.

OTHER FACTUAL SCENARIOS WHICH EVOKE "OBTAINED BY"
FRAUD LANGUAGE UNDER § 523(A)(2)

Several other factual scenarios evoke consideration of the "obtained by"
language in § 523(a)(2). Some of the scenarios pre-date the Husky and Cohen
cases; others continue to arise after those decisions. This section considers those
scenarios in light of the Supreme Court cases and considers whether the decisions
rendered in those cases comport with the Supreme Court's rulings that link the
debtor's nondischargeable liability to the fraudulent actions of the debtor.
This section will examine these scenarios in three main categories. First,
this section considers cases in which fraud occurs after the initial debt is incurred.
Second, it will examine cases where the debtor does not benefit from the fraud,
and it is instead committed in the interest of a third party. Finally, this section
will examine scenarios where the debtor did not perpetrate the fraud but benefits
from the fraud.

5
Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 218 (1998). The Court noted that, structurally, §
523(a)(2) requires not that debt be "obtained by" fraud, but that the "money, property, services,
or ...

renewal ...

of credit" be obtained by fraud, and that property obtained by fraud lead to the

indebtedness.
5

Fraud is an element of piercing the corporate veil. See Husky Int'l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re

Ritz), 513 B.R. 510 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff'd, Husky Int'l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz (In re Ritz), 787 F.3d
312 (5th Cir. 2015), rev'd and remanded, Husky Int'l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581 (2016).
Even so, the District Court found that fraud different than fraud required for nondischargeability:
"While the fraudulent transfer without a misrepresentation may qualify as actual fraud . . . to pierce

the corporate veil, it cannot meet the requirement ...
52
See id.
5
5

Cohen, 523 U.S. at 218.
Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 317 (2003).

to bar the discharge of the debt." Id. at 538.
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FraudWhich Occurs After IncurringDebt

In the classic fraud nondischargeability case, the debtor defrauds the
creditor in their initial interaction, such that the debt itself would never exist but
for the debtor's fraud. The creditor proves the elements for a judgment of fraud
under state law55 or can clearly demonstrate false "pretenses" or
"representation" 5 6 that led the creditor to part with services or value and created
the debtor's payment obligation to the creditor. However, not all fraud causes the
creditor to part with value. Frequently, fraud occurs after the initial incurrence of
the debt, as occurred in Husky, and courts must tackle the question of how to
handle post-incurrence fraud under § 523(a)(2). Though Husky involved fraud
after the incurrence of debt, the decision still required a causal link that must be
explored in the context of other cases.
1.

Fraud Which Causes Additional Extension of Credit or
Forbearance

One of the most common scenarios invoking § 523(a)(2)'s "obtained by"
provision involves an initial extension of credit, with fraud coming later during
the transaction in order to entice the creditor not to terminate the relationship or
57
call the loan. For example, In re Plechaty, a case from the Sixth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, involved a loan made by a syndicate of banks, and
false financial statements and a personal guaranty by the principal of the debtor
provided several years later, which led to a delay in the banks demanding
repayment of the loan. 58 The Code provides for nondischargeability for "an
59
extension, renewal, or refmancing ... obtained by" fraud. The Plechaty case
focused on what constitutes an "extension of credit" and, more particularly,
whether the banks' delay in calling the loan due qualified as an extension of
60
credit sufficient to support § 523(a)(2) nondischargeability. The court found
that "[a] majority of courts have concluded that a debtor who has caused a
creditor to grant a delay in receiving or collecting payment that is due has
61
received an extension of credit within the meaning of § 523(a)(2)" while also

55

Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 290 (1991) (finding that fraud must be shown by a

preponderance of the evidence for nondischargeability purposes and, as a result, any state-court
judgment of fraud necessarily renders the debt nondischargeable in bankruptcy).

11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(A) (West 2021).
See Nat'l City Bank v. Plechaty (In re Plechaty), 213 B.R. 119 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1997).
57
Id. at 122.
58
11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2) (emphasis added).
59
60
In re Plechaty, 213 B.R. at 124-25.
Id. at 124 (citing John Deere Co. v. Gerlach (In re Gerlach), 897 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1990);
61
First Comm. Bank v. Robinson (In re Robinson), 192 B.R. 569 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996); FDIC v.
Cerar (In re Cerar), 84 B.R. 524 (Bankr. C.D. III. 1988); First Bank v. Eaton (In re Eaton), 41 B.R.
800 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984)).
56
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recognizing that several courts hold just the opposite. 62 In agreeing with the
majority of courts, the court noted that a forbearance constitutes just one type of
extension; an extension includes any increased time to pay back debt. 63 The
debtor provided the false financial statements with the intent to cause a delay in
repayment, sufficing for nondischargeability. 64 The court then turned to the issue
of damages, the primary issue involving the "obtained by" language. The debtor
argued for limiting nondischargeable damages to those shown to result from the
fraud. 65 The court held that, upon a showing of an extension of credit received
through fraud, all amounts due qualify as nondischargeable. 66 Thus, while the
debtor argued that the causal link "to the extent obtained by language" applied
to the calculation of which damages would be nondischargeable, the court
instead interpreted the language to apply to whether the fraud creates
nondischargeability of the debt as a whole. 67
In a case remanded by the Supreme Court 68 that made its way back up to
the Circuit Court, 69 the First Circuit likewise rejected a requirement that the
creditor prove that fraud led specifically to damages. The debtor's business
purchased property from the Fields, granting the Fields a mortgage on the

Id. at 125 (citing Howard & Sons, Inc. v. Schmidt (In re Schmidt), 70 B.R. 634 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1986); Drinker, Biddle & Reath v. Bacher (In re Bacher), 47 B.R. 825, 829 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1985); Cement Nat'l Bank v. Colasante (In re Colasante), 12 B.R. 635 (E.D. Pa. 1981)).
63
Id. (citing Extension, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
62

6

Id.

65

Id. at 127.

6
Id. at 128 (citing In re McFarland, 84 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 1996); Shawmut Bank, N.A. v.
Goodrich (In re Goodrich), 999 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1993); In re Gerlach, 897 F.2d 1048; Wolf v.
Campbell, 211 B.R. 14 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Siriani v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. (In re Siriani),
967 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992)). See also In re Goodrich, 999 F.2d at 22 (declining to require

showing of harm from renewal of line of credit obtained through false financial statements, even

though "it is possible that the bank would have called the loan if accurate information had been
furnished on renewal and yet been unable to collect a penny before bankruptcy"); In re Gerlach,

897 F.2d at 1048 (debtor's falsification of sales caused John Deere not to call credit and satisfied
nondischargeability requirements); In re McFarland, 84 F.3d at 943 (refusing to require proof of
damages after debtor obtained extension of credit through fraudulent means); Norris v. First Nat'l

Bank in Luling (In re Norris), 70 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that "renewal of the entire note
was 'obtained by' [debtor's] false documentation" in obtaining renewal of credit). Cf Bombardier
Capital, Inc. v. Baietti (In re Baietti), 189 B.R. 549 (Bankr. D. Me. 1995) (looking at the phrase
"to the extent" as creating a requirement that debtor prove damages were caused by the fraud), with

Field v. Mans, 157 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 1998).
67
In re Plechaty, 213 B.R. at 127.
68
Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995) (indicating that creditors need only establish justifiable,
not reasonable, reliance on fraudulent statement for nondischargeability). Justice Ginsburg's
concurrence specifically noted that the "causation issue" had not been determined by the Court's

opinion. Id. at 78 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
69
In re Mans, 200 B.R. 293 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1996), motion to reconsiderdenied, 203 B.R. 355
(1996), rev'd, 210 B.R. 1 (1st Cir. BAP 1997), rev'd sub nom. Field v. Mans, 157 F.3d 35 (1st Cir.
1998).
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property. The debtor also issued a personal guaranty of the business's debt
obligation to the Fields. 70 The terms of the sale agreement obligated the debtor
7
to notify Fields of the sale of the property. 1 The debtor asked the Fields'
permission to sell the property but did so one day after actually selling the
72
property and without notifying Fields of the sale. The Court first determined
that the lack of acceleration of the debt by the Fields sufficed as an extension of
credit. 73 In so doing, the Court declined to require that the Fields demonstrate
that they would have called the loan had they been aware of the sale or that, after
calling the loan, they could have recovered the obligations owed to them:
[W]e disagree with the BAP that-in order for failure to
accelerate to be equivalent to an extension of credit-"there
would have to be virtual certainty that acceleration would have
taken place." We think it enough, see below, that the Fields were
in a position to have accelerated effectively and might well have
done so.74

&

&

In rendering its decision, the Court focused on the "fresh start" policies and the
75
availability of a discharge only for honest debtors.
This issue arises even outside of traditional lending. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals case of In re Biondo7 6 arose after the debtors hired Foley
Lardner and failed to pay most of the lawyers' fees. After Foley & Lardner filed
suit to collect its fees, the debtors created limited partnerships and transferred
77
significant assets into those partnerships. Eventually, the debtors and Foley
Lardner entered into a settlement agreement by which Foley & Lardner agreed
to hold on collections and reduce the total debt owed in exchange for a security
interest in the limited partnerships and an assignment of the debtors' distributions
from the partnerships. 78 The fraud arose because the debtors "represented that
they maintained and could transfer interests in the Partnerships when, in fact,
those interests already had been placed into [another limited partnership] ."7 The
timing of the fraud compared to the incurrence of the debt presented an issue
because the fraud occurred after the finn provided the initial services causing the
outstanding obligation. 80 The debtors argued that they did not commit fraud but,

70
71

Id.
Mans, 157 F.3d at 37.

72

Id. at 38.

73

Id. at 39.

74

Id. at 44.

?5

Id.

77

Foley & Lardner v. Biondo (In re Biondo), 180 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 129.

78

Id. at 129-30.

79

Id. at 130.

80

Id. at 133.

76
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even if they did so, the debt for the legal services did not accrue because of that
fraud. 81 The court recognized the clear language of § 523(a)(2) requiring a
connection between the receipt of money or benefit and the fraud.8 2 It found,
however, that "secondary debt transactions-extensions, renewals, and
refinancings" procured through fraud also qualify for nondischargeability. 83 The
debtors' fraud "result[ed] in the substitution of one debt for another." 84 The court
focused on the fraud directly leading to the settlement, thus causing the firm to
relinquish its rights to collect on the initial fees at a time when it might have been
able to collect. The fraudulent statements caused the firm to give up those rights,
and the court held that the causal connection sufficed to create
nondischargeability. 85 The court required no showing that, absent the
misstatements and the resulting settlement, the firm could have recovered the
fees owed.
Each of these cases involves two questions, one answered easily and the
other presenting more of a challenge. The first question involves whether the
debtor received an extension or refinancing of credit. In each case, the court
found such an extension because the debtor continued to receive the ability to
use the credit given without an enforcement action by the creditor. The second
question involves the extent to which the debtor "obtained" that extension or
refinancing of credit through the fraud. While often phrased as a question of
damages, every creditor seeking nondischargeability incurred damages because
each failed to receive payment from the debtor. The real issue, according to each
of these courts, entails whether the fraud caused the extension rather than
whether the extension led to damages, as further noted by the court in Wolf v.
Campbell.86 Wolf involved a fraudulent representation made by the debtor after
the initial incurrence of the loan and in order to induce forbearance by the
creditor-a form of further extension of credit. 87 The bankruptcy court allowed
discharge because the creditor failed to demonstrate that the misrepresentations
led to additional damages that would not have otherwise occurred: 88
In common parlance, the bankruptcy court said that Campbell
was broke when he made financial representations to Wolf, and

81
82

Id. at 131, 133.
Id. at 131-33.

83

Id. at 131.
84
Id. at 132-33 (citing In re McFarland, 84 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also Dominion Bank
v. Nuckolls, 780 F.2d 408 (4th Cir. 1985).
85
In re Biondo, 180 F.3d at 135.
86

87
88

211 B.R. 14 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
Id.
Id. at 15.
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therefore since Wolf lost nothing by the misrepresentation,
89
Campbell is entitled to the discharge of his debt.
The district court disagreed, and in so doing, considered cases focused
90
on the need to prove damages while discussing proximate causation.
Ultimately, the court determined that it would "not ... engage in a statutory
exegesis focusing on the words 'for money, property, services, or an extension,
renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by,' 11 U.S.C.A. §
523(a) ... ."91 In so doing, it also stated that the "[d]ischarge of debts is for
honest debtors. That a debtor does not profit by a misdeed is no occasion to
ignore the misdeed." 92
Not all courts make the entire debt nondischargeable simply because the
debtor made a misrepresentation that caused the creditor not to call the loan. In
In re Baietti,93 the bankruptcy court limited damages to the amount that the
creditor could prove an ability to collect absent the fraudulent extension of credit.
The debtor's business included the sale of boats financed by the creditor and
94
secured by the boats themselves and the debtor's personal guaranty. As the
debtor sold boats, the agreement required that the business use the value received
for the boats to repay the creditor. 95 The creditor's manager regularly visited the
business to check that the boats had not been sold without payment to the
creditor. 96 The debtor sold several boats that secured the creditor's loan without
using the proceeds of sale to pay the creditor; the creditor did not discover the
sales because the boats were still on the premises during the manager's periodic
97
checks of the inventory, and the debtor did not inform the creditor of the sales.
The creditor argued that relinquishing its right to call the loan and liquidate the
collateral constituted an extension of credit and the entire loan balance would
thus be nondischargeable; the debtor argued that nondischargeability requires
proof of damages caused by the fraud, and without the extension of new credit
98
to the debtor that causation does not exist. Though declining to hold that any
fraud leading to an "involuntary" extension of credit by preventing the creditor
from discovering a situation that might have allowed the creditor to recover

89
Id. at 16.
Id. (discussing "the abundant precedential authority holding that the proximate cause
90
element is an impermissible addition to the statute" in the same discussion as a case indicating that

"[h]ad Congress wished to add 'damage' as an element, it could easily have done so") (quoting
Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Goodrich (In re Goodrich), 999 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1993)).
Id. at 16 (emphasis in original).
91
92

Id.

93

Bombardier Capital, Inc. v. Baietti (In re Baietti), 189 B.R. 549 (Bankr. D. Me. 1995).

94

Id.

95

Id.

96

Id. at 551-52.

97

Id. at 552.

98

Id. at 556.

at 551.
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sufficed as an extension of credit, the court found a clear causal connection
between the debtor's dishonesty and the creditor's affirmative choice not to call
the loan,99 bolstered in large part by the creditor's history of requiring strict
compliance with the requirement to use the sale proceeds to repay the loan.100
Even so, the court noted that the discharge exception applies only to the portion
of the debt that continued to exist because of the fraud. 101 In the case at hand,
that applied only to the boats sold after the misrepresentation and that, absent the
misrepresentation, the creditor could have repossessed and sold the property. 02
In enacting the Code, Congress discussed refinancing debt:
In many cases, a creditor is required by state law to refinance
existing credit on which there has been no default. If the creditor
does not forfeit remedies or otherwise rely to his detriment on a
false financial statement with respect to existing credit, then an
extension, renewal, or refinancing of such credit is
nondischargeable only to the extent of the new money advanced;
on the other hand, if an existing loan is in default or the creditor
otherwise reasonably relies to his detriment on a false financial
statement with regard to an existing loan, then the entire debt is
nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(B). This codifies the
reasoning expressed by the second circuit in In re Danns, 558
F.2d 114 (2nd [C]ir. 1977).o03
The quoted language suggests that none of the debt can be discharged if
the creditor relinquishes rights because of the fraud (and, specifically, a false

'o

Id. at 557.
Id. at 552.

101

Id.

99

Id. at 558.
Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Goodrich (In re Goodrich), 999 F.2d 22, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1993)
(emphasis added) (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 32399, 33998 (1978) (statements of Rep. Edwards and
DeConcini)). Before adoption of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Act provided for
nondischargeability of fraud debts. S. REP. No. 95-989, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5864 ("As under
the Bankruptcy Act Sec. 17A(2), a debt for obtaining money, property, services, or a refinancing
extension or renewal of credit by . . . fraud,. . . is excepted from discharge. This provision is
modified only slightly from current Section 17A(2)."). Shortly before adoption of the Code, the
02

103

Second Circuit dealt with the Act's provision. Household Finance Corporation v. Danns (In re

Danns), 558 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1977), superseded by statute 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(B) (West
2021). The In re Danns case dealt with two loans-one made and renewed before the debtor's
fraudulent statement and one made after the debtor's fraudulent statement. Id. at 115. The Court

allowed the debtor to discharge the initial loan because, to the extent that the bank renewed the
initial loan, it did so unrelated to the fraudulent statements made in connection with the second
loan. Thus, no causation existed between the fraudulent statements and the renewal of the first
loan. Id. at 116 ("There was no evidence that the original loan was renewed in reliance on the false
representation" and noting that "[t]his was not a true extension of the original loan" because "the

original loan was renewed only because state law required that it be consolidated with the new
loan."). Id.
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financial statement). 104 In other words, once the creditor establishes reliance, an
element specifically listed for false financial statements, the entire debt faces
nondischargeability. While it mentions the creditor's detriment, it does so in
establishing that none of the debt can be discharged-an indication that there
must be a causal link but no affirmative showing of the amount of damage caused
by the misstatement. Thus, the creditor need not establish that the creditor would
have succeeded in recovering on the debt if the fraud had not occurred and the
loan had not been extended.
105
The legislative history cites to In re Danns, noting that the new
provision referring to the refinancing of credit codifies the holding in that case.
In re Danns involved a debtor who engaged in fraud when simultaneously
obtaining a second loan and renewing a first loan from Household Finance
Corporation ("HFC").1 06 At the time, the Bankruptcy Act-the predecessor to
today's Bankruptcy Code-provided for nondischargeability for "liabilities for
obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false representations, or for
obtaining money or property on credit or obtaining an extension or renewal of
credit in reliance upon a materially false statement in writing respecting his
Thus, the issue involved modern-day §
financial condition ... ."107
108
not the "false pretenses," "false representation," and "actual
523(a)(2)(B),
fraud" provisions under (a)(2)(A). In determining that "the creditor should be
entitled to bar discharge only of that portion of his loan as was obtained
fraudulently,"10 9 the In re Danns court focused on the lack of connection between
the renewal of the initial loan and the making of the false representation-a lack
of justifiable reliance rather than a lack of damages. The creditor relied on the
false statement in extending the new loan but not in renewing the initial loan; as
1 0
a result, the court allowed discharge of the initial debt. Interestingly, the In re
Danns court did not, as the legislative history suggests, clearly indicate that "if
an existing loan is in default or the creditor otherwise reasonably relies to his
detriment on a false financial statement with regard to an existing loan, then the
1
entire debt is nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(B)."" Rather, the In re
Danns Court indicated that, absent a showing of reasonable reliance on a
financial statement in the renewal or refinancing of a loan, the initial loan amount

05

See infra note 119 (discussing other legislative history indicating the same idea).
In re Danns, 558 F.2d at 114.

106

The initial loan had to be refinanced in order to take out the second loan under state law. Id.

04

at 115 n.l.
107
11 U.S.C.A. § 35(a).
108

That section provides for nondischargeability for "use of a statement in writing-(i) that is

materially false; (ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition; (iii) on which the
creditor . . . reasonably relied; and (iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent

to deceive." 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2)(B).
109
In re Danns, 558 F.2d at 116.
110

1

Id.

124 Cong. Rec. 32399 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
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could be discharged. Further, In re Danns focused on the question of whether
damages must be shown within the § 523(a)(2)(B) "financial statement"
exception, rather than the § 523(a)(2)(A) fraud or false representation
nondischargeability test. As a result, the legislative history and circuit court cases
provide little concrete guidance as to the appropriate standard to apply in
determining whether to discharge all debt resulting from fraud.
While the In re Danns case and the legislative history focus on §
523(a)(2)(B), the Supreme Court's decision in Field v. Mans focused on actual
fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A)." 2 But, like In re Danns, the Field Court looked at
reliance by the creditor upon the fraudulent misstatement to establish
nondischargeability." 3 The cases differ in that the Field Court bases that
requirement of reliance on the phrase "to the extent obtained by" in §
523(a)(2)(A) rather than on the express reliance element provided for in §
523(a)(2)(B)." 4 On remand, the bankruptcy court and ultimately circuit court
both found the basis for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A) due to the
creditor's justifiable reliance on the debtor's false representations." 5 Notably,
the First Circuit focused on how the false representations led the creditor to give
up rights it could have exercised had it known the true scenario, holding that
"[b]ut for the fraud they could have withdrawn the credit they had previously
extended"" 6 and specifically rejecting a requirement that the creditor
demonstrate that it would have taken such action." 7
At this point, each of the circuit courts considering the "obtained by"
language rejects a requirement that a creditor demonstrate damages resulting
from the debtor's fraud. Instead, each focuses on the creditor relinquishing rights,
without the stricter showing that the creditor would have exercised those rights
or even more strict showing that the creditor would have been successful in
recovering had it sought to exercise those rights. This result comports with the
Supreme Court's broad reading of "obtained by" in Husky and other cases
because it suggests that when the creditor continues to extend credit following
fraud, that continued extension occurs because of the fraud and is thus "obtained
by" the fraud.1' All of the credit that continues to exist can be traced to the

12

516 U.S. 59 (1995).

"3

Id. at 61.

114

Id. at 66 ("No one, of course, doubts that some degree of reliance is required to satisfy the

element of causation inherent in the phrase 'obtained by."').
115
Id. at 64-65.
116
Field v. Mans, 157 F.3d 35, 43 (1st Cir. 1998) (emphasis added) (discussing whether the
lack of acceleration constituted an extension of credit).
"7

Id. at 44.

118
It is possible that in such a scenario, a creditor actually benefits from the debtor's fraud. For
example, in the Foley case, the firm might have sought recovery had it not been enticed to enter

into a settlement agreement through the debtor's fraud. And it is entirely possible that the firm
would have been unsuccessful in recovering any of the debt before the debtor filed for bankruptcy
protection. To the extent that the debt was not paid in the bankruptcy case, the debt owed to the

2022]
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fraudulent statement and is, thus, nondischargeable. 119 The Code does not require
that the debt itself exist because of the fraud, but rather that the extension of credit
be obtained by the fraud. 12 0 Put in the context of the Supreme Court standards
outlined earlier, but for12 1 the fraud, the creditor would not have extended the
credit and, thus, the credit extended falls within the nondischargeability
provisions. Even if the creditor would have suffered the same damages regardless
of the fraud, such a result comports with the policy of § 523(a)(2)(A), which
seeks to protect victims of fraud and not allow the perpetrators to enter the
bankruptcy system with unclean hands and abuse its provisions to the detriment
of its victims. 1 22

firm would have been discharged. But, because of the debtor's later fraud, the firm now enjoys the
benefit of nondischargeability and a greater likelihood of payment in the future.
119
With the exception of the In re Biondo case, each of the circuit court cases considered in

this section involved a false financial statement. Under § 523(a)(2)(B), the creditor must
"reasonably rely" on the statement to render the debt nondischargeable. 11 U.S.C.A. §
523(a)(2)(B)(iii) (West 2021). The legislative history for § 523(a)(2) provides that:
The amount of the debt made nondischargeable on account of a false financial
statement is not limited to the 'New Value' extended when a loan is rolled
over. If an initial loan is made subject to a false financial statement and new
money is advanced under a subsequent loan that is not made under conditions
of fraud or false pretenses, then only the initial amount of the loan made on the
original financial statement is invalidated and excepted from discharge. On the
other hand, where the original financial statement is made under nonfraudulent
conditions and the entire loan in addition to new money is advanced under a
subsequent false financial statement, the entire loan is made under fraudulent
conditions. This rule is sound as a matter of policy because the creditor relies
to his detriment with respect to the entire amount advanced under the false
financial statement. Legal rights with respect to the amount previously
advanced may be altered; interest rates may be changed, maturity dates may
be extended, and legal remedies may be forgone in reliance on the new false
financial statement. However, if the terms of the new agreement are identical
to the old agreement with respect to the old money, then no new money was

obtained by a false statement on which the creditor relied since the creditor's
rights were unchanged; therefore, only that portion of the false financial

statement that applied to new money would be nondischargeable.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6090-91. Thus, while the courts in those cases
each held the debt nondischargeable, each presumed that the creditor reasonably relied to its
detriment on the financial statement in opting to continue to extend the initial credit. No such

reliance element appears in the general fraud nondischargeability provision. 11 U.S.C.A. §
523(a)(2)(A).
120

See Koha, supra note 11, at Part IV.A.1 ("The most sensible reading-and the reading that

accords with prior precedent-is that one does not 'obtain' debts, but rather one 'obtains' money,
property, or services.") (arguing that Supreme Court's Husky decision actually provides for
nondischargeability for "debts" obtained by fraud by eliminating the causal connection between

money obtained by debtor and nondischargeability).
121

See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.

122

St. Laurent v. Ambrose (In re St. Laurent), 991 F.2d 672, 680 (11th Cir. 1993).
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Fraudulent Conveyances

The Husky case involved a fraudulent conveyance by the debtor after the
inception of the loan. The Supreme Court held that a fraudulent conveyance
qualifies as the basis for nondischargeability, as long as the conveyance relates
to the indebtedness.1 23 Like the extension of credit scenario, the debtor-creditor
relationship in a fraudulent conveyance system begins without fraud, but the
debtor engages in fraudulent activity that prevents the creditor from collecting
its debt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, considering a similar situation,
followed the Husky Court's lead the following year in DZ Bank AG Deutsche
Zentral-GenossenschaftBank v. Meyer."' Meyer owned and managed Choice
Cash Advance L.L.C, which borrowed money from Brooke Credit Corporation,
granting Brooke a security interest in its assets. Meyer and his wife personally
guaranteed the debt obligation.2 5 Eventually, DZ Bank purchased the obligation
from Brooke Credit Corporation and provided several forbearances and
modifications of the loan. The Meyers then transferred $385,000 of assets to
prevent creditors from reaching those assets shortly before Choice defaulted on
its loan.1 26 DZ Bank successfully argued that the transfers constituted fraudulent
transfers under state law and then argued for nondischargeability of the debt.1 27
While the bankruptcy court limited nondischargeability to the amount "traceable
to DZ Bank's security interest in the assets,"' 2 8 the Ninth Circuit found the entire
$385,000 in transferred assets to be nondischargeable fraud. The Ninth Circuit's
ruling focused on causation. To the extent that the Meyers transferred assets, a
direct causal link existed between the fraudulent transfer and the inability of
creditors to reach those assets. As a result, the Meyers enjoyed that amount of
assets that otherwise could have gone to DZ Bank to satisfy the guaranty, even
if the creditor did not hold a lien on any assets.1 2 9 A similar situation arose in In
re Bloemendaal,30 in which the debtor allegedly transferred his residential
property into a trust in order to protect it from creditors when it appeared he
would face liability on a guaranty of business debt. Neither the business debt nor
the guaranty arose from fraud, but an allegedly fraudulent act prevented the
creditor (or the trustee on behalf of the estate) from reaching assets that could

123

See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.

124
125

869 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 840-41.

126

Id. at 841.

127

Id. at 842 (indicating that bankruptcy court found that transfer met fraudulent transfer

requirements).
28
Id.
129

Id. at 843.

130
Foster v. Bloemendaal (In re Bloemendaal), Case No. 16-600059-7, Adv. No. 16-00047,
2016 WL 7852312 (Bankr. D. Mont. Dec. 22, 2016).
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pay the debt. 13 1 The court, relying on Husky, denied the debtor's motion to
dismiss, noting that a fraudulent conveyance may serve as the basis for
of
elements
all
establishes
creditor
if the
nondischargeability
nondischargeability.1 32 Notably, each of the cases involved the debtor
transferring assets from the debtor's business to the debtor personally (or to
another business owned by the debtor) and, thus, the debtor personally benefitted
by the fraudulent transfer.
However, not all cases embrace Husky as a decision allowing
nondischargeability for any fraud that results in the debtor's receipt of property
that could have been used to repay creditors. In re Wilson involved entry of a
judgment against the debtor under a construction contract shortly before the
debtor fraudulently transferred his residential property to an L.L.C., presumably
13 3
to avoid it being taken in satisfaction of the judgment. The plaintiff argued that
the debtor's fraud in transferring the residential property sufficed for
34
The court disagreed, noting
nondischargeability status under § 523(a)(2)(A).
between the fraud and the
exist
must
a
connection
that even in light of Husky,
35
nondischargeable.1
incurrenceof the debt in order to render the debt
These three cases differ from Husky in one important facet-each
involves a liability voluntarily incurred by the debtor personally that served as
the basis for liability to the creditor. In Husky, the debtor's liability arose through
piercing the corporate veil-a liability that existed only as a result of the debtor's
fraudulent actions. But in DZ Bank, In re Bloemendaal, and In re Wilson, the
debtor agreed to take on liability outside of the fraudulent action. The mere
existence of a guaranty does not create nondischargeability. The issue, then,
becomes whether the fraudulent transfer occurring after the guaranty comes into
existence and after the business owes money suffices for nondischargeability.
The liability does not arise because of the fraud; rather, the fraud makes payment
to the creditor less likely because the fraud left the obligor without assets to pay.
The obligation of the debtor arose when the initial payment couldn't be made
due to the lack of assets, and the creditor either invoked a guaranty by the debtor
or sought recovery under fraudulent transfer laws. In essence, the fact that the
creditor needed to use the guaranty or fraudulent transfer provisions to recover
from the debtor arose because of the debtor's fraud and should create the causal
nexus necessary to create liability.
But that liability should have limits. The language of § 523(a)(2)
prohibits nondischargeability on "debt ... for property .. . obtained by ... actual

131

132

Id. at *1.
Id. at *6-7 (rejecting the debtor's argument that the Ritz holding is dicta).

Norton v. Wilson (In re Wilson), Case No. 16-30782, Adv. No. 16-3068, 2017 WL 1628878,
13
slip op. at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 1, 2017).
134

Id.

at * 1.

Id. at *7 (distinguishing Husky because the Husky debtor's "liability to the creditor arose if
13
at all through a scheme of fraudulent transfers he caused the original corporate obligor to make"
whereas this creditor received a judgment of liability against the debtor before any fraud occurred).
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fraud." 13 6 In each case, the debtor owes a debt, and the debtor obtained property
(either directly or through another receiving entity) from the initial obligor
through fraud. But the debt is not for that property transfer. For example, in DZ
Bank, the amount due to the creditor exceeded $1.7 million, and the debtor
guaranteed that full amount. 3 7 But only $385,000 of that obligation could be
attributed to the fraudulent transfer.1 38 If the debtor had not transferred $385,000
out of the company, it would have been available to pay the creditor, and the
debtor would not owe that portion under the guaranty. For that reason, the
creditor cannot claim the entire $1.7 million owed under the guaranty as
nondischargeable, but only the amount that would not have been due as a result
of the fraud-$385,000.1 39 At first glance, this concept of limiting the
nondischargeable portion of the loan to that directly linked to the fraudulent
action seems inconsistent with the prior section, where the entire loan amount
could be nondischargeable. It appears to be a calculation of the damages resulting
from the fraud, which the courts routinely reject in the extension of credit cases.
However, in such cases, the fraud led to an extension of the entire amount of the
initial credit, but the credit might not have been given at all but for the fraud. In
the situation of DZ Bank, without the fraud, the debtor would have owed
$385,000 less on the guaranty because, presumably, the $385,000 would have
been available to pay the creditor. But the debtor would still face liability under

136

11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(2) (West 2021). The original language of § 523(a)(2) denied discharge

"for obtaining money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinance of credit, by-(A)
false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud." It was amended to its current version in

1984. Pub. L. No. 98-353 § 454, 98 Stat. 354 (1984).
13
DZ Bank AG Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaft Bank v. Meyer, 869 F.3d 839, 841 (9th Cir.
2017).
18

Id. at 842.

139

This is the exact result reached by the court in holding the $385,000 claim as

nondischargeable. See supra note 128. See also Baytree Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Christensen (In

re Christensen), Bankr. No. 04 B 17486, Adv. No. 04 A 3646, 2005 WL 1941231 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
Aug. 12, 2005). Per the facts deemed to be admitted, the creditor, Baytree, loaned the debtor's
company almost $1 million, secured by mortgages on the lots to be developed with the loan money.
The debtor and his wife guaranteed payment on the loans. The debtor submitted monthly
statements indicating the work completed on the project; Baytree released the loan money based
on the statements. Id. at *I. Of course, the debtor misstated the amount of work completed,
fraudulently inducing the creditor to release roughly $150,000 more than it would have done with
correct information. Baytree eventually foreclosed upon the lots and spent just over $125,000 to
finish construction of the lots. Shortly thereafter, the debtor filed for bankruptcy protection, and
Baytree sought nondischargeability on its entire $275,000 claim. Id. at *2. After determining that
all elements of fraud existed, the court moved to a determination on the amount of Baytree's claim

that qualified for fraud nondischargeability. Focusing on the "to the extent obtained by" language
of § 523(a)(2), the court confined nondischargeability "to that portion of the debt directly
attributable to fraudulent acts." Id. at *4 (citing F.T.C. v. Austin (In re Austin), 138 B.R. 898

(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992); McCullough v. Suter (In re Suter), 59 B.R. 944 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986)).
The court noted that if the debtor failed to complete construction but without fraud, Baytree would

still have spent the additional $125,000 to finish the project and, thus, that amount did not result
from fraud but from the need to complete an unfinished project. Id. at *5.
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the guaranty for the remaining $1.315 million regardless of the fraud. In both
cases, the causal link suggested by the Husky and other Supreme Court cases
exists when-but for the fraud-the liability could have been satisfied.
B.

Cases Where FraudBenefits a Third Party Rather than the Debtor

While debtors generally benefit from the fraud they promote, situations
do arise in which fraud benefits a third party rather than the debtor. Several
Circuit Courts have considered whether a debtor's fraud from which the debtor
receives no direct benefit qualifies for nondischargeability.
The In re Bilzerian"0 case out of the Eleventh Circuit considered
misrepresentations by the debtor that caused HSSM to make investments. At
14
trial, the jury and the court found the debtor guilty of fraud. ' However, the trial
2
court did not make a finding that the debtor benefitted directly from the fraud.1
The Eleventh Circuit considered "whether a debtor, who did not individually
receive the fruits of his or her fraud, but nevertheless received some benefit, has
obtained 'money, property, services, or an extension, renewal or refinancing of
credit"' under § (a)(2).14 3 The court began by noting three possibilities in
answering this question: (1) a narrow construction whereby nondischargeability
requires that "the debtor personally receive the fruits of the fraud," (2) a broad
construction providing that nondischargeability requires fraud, regardless of
benefit received, or (3) a middle construction requiring that the debtor receive
some benefit"4 to find nondischargeability. The court noted agreement among
all circuits considering the issue and sided with the other circuits in selecting the
middle option and requiring some benefit to accrue to the debtor for a finding of
nondischargeability.1 45 Courts commonly refer to this position as the "receipt of
benefits" theory because it requires that the debtor benefit from the fraud, even
46
if the debtor does not directly "obtain" the value defrauded from the victim.1 I
so doing, the court noted that requiring that the debtor directly receive the "fruits"

40

HSSM #7 Ltd. P'ship v. Bilzerian (In re Bilzerian), 100 F.3d 886 (11th Cir. 1996).

41

Id. at 888.

142

Id. at 889.

143

Id.
Even if some benefit must be shown, the connection may be relatively limited. For example,
in S.P. Investments Ltd. P'ship v. O'Connor(In re O'Connor), 145 B.R. 883 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1992), the debtor and his wife fraudulently caused a bank to loan money to the debtor's business.
The court held that the receipt of money by the company inured to the benefit of the debtor-owner
and necessarily benefitted the debtor's wife as well (but allowed the discharge of the wife's
144

obligation for failure to meet another requirement of nondischargeability) Id. at 895.
In re Bilzerian, 100 F.3d at 890 (citing BancBoston Mortgage Corp. v. Ledford (In re
145
Ledford), 970 F.2d 1556 (6th Cir. 1992); Luce v. First Equip. Leasing Corp. (In re Luce), 960 F.2d
1277 (5th Cir. 1992); Ashley v. Church (In re Ashley), 903 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1990)). See also
Arm v. Morrison (In re Arm), 87 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 1996).

146

In re Bilzerian, 100 F.3d at 890.
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of the fraud goes beyond the express language of the Code.1 47 While at the time
of In re Bilzerian, all circuits considering the issue agreed to a "receipt of
benefits" requirement, a Circuit Split now exists on that issue. That split arises,
in part, from the Supreme Court's 1998 decision in Cohen v. de la Cruz.14
Two years after the Cohen decision, the Fourth Circuit seemingly
abandoned the receipt of benefits test. The debtor in Pleasants v. Kendricks149
misrepresented his qualifications to the Kendricks when working with them on a
home addition. After learning of Pleasants' misrepresentations, the Kendricks
agreed to continue under the contract" 0 pursuant to an agreement that Pleasants'
company would meet certain construction milestones. Ultimately, the company
failed to meet those requirements, and the Kendricks obtained a judgment against
Pleasants, who then filed for bankruptcy protection.' 5 ' The Kendricks argued for
nondischargeability of the judgment under § (a)(2)(A); Pleasants responded that
the "obtained by" requirement mandates that the debtor directly receive the
transfer from the creditor. 5 2 In the case at hand, the funds paid by the Kendricks
went to subcontractors hired by Pleasants rather than to Pleasants himself. The
court disagreed, noting that the Cohen case determined that nondischargeability
includes any debt existing because of the fraud regardless of whether the debtor
actually received the funds. 13 To hold otherwise would allow some debtors who
defraud to escape nondischargeability despite their wrongful action. 5 4 Since the
Pleasants decision, two other circuit courts have abandoned the receipt of
benefits test. 55

147

Id. at 891.

48

Cohen v. de

149

la

Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998). See also supra note 10, at Part B.

219 F.3d 372 (4th Cir. 2000).

15
Pleasants also argued that the intervening agreement, entered into after the Kendricks
learned of the fraud, meant that the debt no longer existed because of the fraud. The court disagreed.
Id. at 375-76. While the court did not discuss this argument at length, the court focused on
causation because the debt would not have existed but for the fraud since the forbearance
agreement merely served "to salvage what they could from the situation at hand," and that situation

occurred because of the fraud. Id. The fraud caused the Kendricks to enter into the contract and
suffer damages, even if they continued under the contract without any additional fraud. This result
accords with the causal link promoted by the Supreme Court, and with its decision in Archer v.

Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003), which rejected an argument by the debtor that a subsequent contract
serves as a novation and replaces what could otherwise be a nondischargeable fraud claim with a
dischargeable contract claim.
151
152

153
1s4

In re Pleasants, 219 F.3d at 374.
Id. at 375.

Id.
Id.

"5
Muegler v. Bening, 413 F.3d 980, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing the Cohen case as favoring
a broad interpretation of § 523(a)(2) in order to protect victims of fraud); Ghomeshi v. Sabban (In
re Sabban), 600 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting receipt of benefits test, but also finding lack
of causation between contractor's fraud and liability to homeowner).
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The Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel also considered whether
the debtor must personally receive the property obtained by fraud in In re
Thompson.' 5 6 Thompson operated nursing homes and made several
misrepresentations to the state health department in obtaining the certificate to
operate the nursing homes.15' One of those misrepresentations indicated that he
would remain actively involved in the operation of the nursing homes when, in
fact, he did not participate in-and arguably never intended to participate inmanagement of the homes. Ultimately, one of the residents died as a result of
inadequate care, and her estate obtained a judgment against the home. When
Thompson filed for bankruptcy protection, the estate argued that Thompson
should be held personally liable for the home's obligations via piercing of the
corporate veil. The estate also argued that Thompson's fraudulent statements to
the state led to the inadequate care and, thus, he could not discharge the debt
resulting from those statements.1 58 The court began by considering whether a
debt that arose under a veil-piercing theory could qualify for fraud
nondischargeability. It rejected the debtor's argument that the state court must
find fraud as the basis for liability for the bankruptcy court to find
nondischargeability.1 59 Rather, it held that "[c]laims established under state law
on grounds other than fraud are not automatically precluded from qualifying for
60
Instead, if the creditor
the exception to discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A)."1
establishes all elements of section (a)(2)-including that "the debtor obtained
money, property, services, or credit by the actual fraud"-the debt qualifies for
nondischargeability.161 Discussing the "obtained by" requirement, the court
noted that "there is no requirement that the debt be for something the debtor
obtains from the creditor."' 62 Ultimately, the court remanded for further factual

156

Hatfield v. Thompson (In re Thompson), 555 B.R. 1 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2016).

157

Id. at 4.

158
159

Id. at 5-6.

160
161

162

Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 9.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
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determinations.' 63 The Thompson court recognized the receipt of benefit issue
but specifically declined to render a decision on that issue."
Nunnery v. Rountree distinguished the result in the Pleasants case and
declined to extend § 523(a)(2)'s nondischargeability provision.1 65 Nunnery filed
an insurance claim following an automobile accident; the insurer hired Rountree
to investigate Nunnery's claim. In the investigation, Rountree "befriended
Nunnery and convinced her to attempt activities in which Nunnery was reluctant
to participate because of her injuries."' 66 Rountree then videotaped Nunnery
participating in the activities, and the insurer used those tapes against Nunnery
in ensuing litigation over the insurance claim.1 67 Nunnery sued Rountree and
received an award in arbitration before Rountree filed for bankruptcy protection;
Nunnery then received an award of damages following trial post-bankruptcy.
Nunnery sought a declaration of nondischargeability on that award in Rountree's
bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy court held the debt nondischargeable, but the
district court reversed on the basis of the phrase "obtained by" in § 523(a)(2).1 68
The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court, holding that the debtor must
benefit by the fraud for a finding of nondischargeability:
The plain language of the subsection under which Nunnery
seeks relief requires the debtor to have obtained money,
property, services, or credit through her fraud or use of false
pretenses. It is clear from the structure of the phrase that "to the
extent obtained" modifies the money, property, services, or
credit that constitute the debt. A plain reading of this subsection
demonstrates that Congress excepted from discharge not simply
any debt incurred as a result of fraud but only debts in which the
debtor used fraudulent means to obtain money, property,

163
Id. at 14. Interestingly, one court within the Tenth Circuit impliedly interpreted the
Thompson decision as requiringthat the debtor receive a benefit from the fraud, even though the
Thompson court suggested otherwise:
The Tenth Circuit has not ruled on the "receipt of benefits" issue. The Tenth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel recently held, however, that to prevail in
a § 523(a)(2)(A) actual fraud claim, a creditor must provide that "the debtor
obtained money, property, services, or credit by the actual fraud." ... It did
not address whether the benefit must come from the creditor.
Torres-Montoya v. Montoya (In re Torres-Montoya), 580 B.R. 556, 563 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2017).
The Court focused primarily on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Rountree, however, as the basis
for its determination that a debtor must receive a benefit and that benefit must come from the

creditor to establish nondischargeability.
'
Thompson, 555 B.R. at 13 n.73.
165
478 F.3d 215, 222 (4th Cir. 2007).
166
Id. at 217.
167

Id.at217-18.

168

Id. at 218.
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services, or credit. Structurally, the subsection can have no other
meaning.
The court recognized that Rountree committed fraud and that fraud
injured Nunnery but declined to find nondischargeability when Rountree did not
personally benefit from that fraud. 17 0 In so doing, the court considered prior
Supreme Court decisions regarding fraud nondischargeability, particularly
noting that the Supreme Court's decisions regularly provide nondischargeability
for any debt arising from the fraud. Those cases, however, involved situations in
which the debtor clearly received value from the creditor through the debtor's
7
fraud, and thus cannot extend to the facts presented by Rountree. ' It also
recognized its own precedent, particularly distinguishing Pleasants as a case in
which the debtor received an indirect benefit through his fraud. 172 In its decision,
the Rountree court essentially returns to the idea promoted in Bilzerian-a
middle ground in which the debtor must receive some benefit in order to declare
the debt nondischargeable. While a direct receipt of the benefits of the fraud is
not required, there must at least be some indirect benefit received by the debtor.
Notably, the Rountree Court suggests that the earlier decision by the same court
was also a receipt of benefits decision because it indicated that Pleasants did
benefit by the payments made to his subcontractors, even if he did not directly
receive the payments himself. 17 3
The middle ground proposed by Bilzerian and the majority of circuit
courts works well in a common situation-one in which the owner of a business
commits the fraud on the business's behalf and, thus, receives an indirect benefit
from the fraud.1 74 At first glance, the requirement of a benefit received by the
debtor seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court's very broad interpretation of
the "obtained by" requirement as merely requiring a "but for" causal connection
between the fraud perpetrated by the debtor and the resulting debt owed by the

169

Id. at 219.

170

Id. at 220.

Id. at 220, 222 (citing Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 321 (2003); Cohen v. De La Cruz,
523 U.S. 213, 215 (1998); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 (1979)).
172
Id. at 222.
171

173

Id. The PleasantsCourt never discusses the receipt of benefits test and focuses on the issue

raised by Pleasants regarding whether "§ 523(a)(2)(A)'s 'obtained by' language requires that some
portion of a creditor's claim must have been directly transferred from the creditor to the debtor."

Pleasants v. Kendrick (In re Pleasants), 219 F.3d 372, 375 (2000). This does, indeed, raise the
possibility that Pleasants does not truly abandon the receipt of benefits test but instead only

requires an indirect benefit to the defrauding debtor to suffice for nondischargeability.
See, e.g., Bombardier Capital, Inc. v. Baietti (In re Baietti), 189 B.R. 549 (Bankr. D. Me.
174
1995). In re Baietti involved a fraudulent scheme in connection with a loan given to the corporation
owned by the debtor. The court found the debtor's guaranty of debt nondischargeable on account
of the fraud because the debtor received an "attenuated" benefit from the fraud. It specifically
declined to determine whether a benefit was required under the factual circumstances at hand. In

re Baietti, 189 B.R. at 556-57.
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debtor to the creditor. Indeed, as courts note, the Code does not include any
requirement of benefit-direct or indirect-to the debtor by the harm.17 5
However, each Supreme Court case dealing with the "obtained by" requirement
involved situations in which the debtor actually benefited from the fraud. 176 As
a result, the Supreme Court has not yet dealt with the receipt of benefits issue. 177
Situations rarely occur in which the debtor truly receives no benefit,
either direct or indirect, from the debtor's fraud. People naturally engage in riskbenefit analysis,17 8 and engaging in fraud with no potential benefit seems
unlikely. Such an unusual situation arose in Kovens v. Goodwich.179 Kovens
received a judgment against Goodwich prior to Goodwich's bankruptcy filing. 180
A third party, Glorioso, convinced Goodwich to invest in a series of concerts;
Glorioso eventually served three years in prison for his fraudulent schemes.
Goodwich, in turn, convinced some of his clients-including Kovens-to invest
in the concerts. Goodwich even personally guaranteed loans taken out by his
clients to participate in the investment opportunities. 18' While the concerts really
occurred, Glorioso lacked any part in them and fraudulently took the funds
invested in them. In convincing Kovens to invest in the concerts, Goodwich
presented Kovens with post-dated checks from Glorioso payable to others who

175

Bilzerian v. Bilzerian (In re Bilzerian), 100 F.3d 886, 891 (11th Cir. 1996).

176

In Husky, Ritz's fraudulent conveyance benefitted his other companies, thereby indirectly
benefitting him as the owner of those companies. Husky Intern. Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 578 U.S. 356,
357-58 (2016). In Cohen, the debtor-landlord received a direct benefit by overcharging rent to

tenants. Cohen, 523 U.S. at 215.
177
One very early Supreme Court case may provide some basis for the receipt of benefits test.
In Strang v. Bradner, 114 U.S. 555 (1885), the Court considered imputed fraud liability in a
partnership context. The non-defrauding partners found themselves liable for the fraudulent actions
of one of their partners, even though they neither participated in nor had knowledge of the partner's

fraud. They sought discharge of the liability for the partner's fraud in bankruptcy. Id. at 557-58.
The Supreme Court held that fraud nondischargeability extended to the debtors' liabilities because
"partners cannot escape pecuniary responsibility ... upon the ground that such misrepresentations
were made without their knowledge. This is especially so when, as in the case before us, the

partners ... received and appropriated the fruits of the fraudulent conduct." Id. at 561. However,
this decision did not require a receipt of benefits but instead noted that in the case at hand, the
debtors had received a benefit from their partner's fraudulent conduct. Id.
178
See Daniel Romer, Valerie F. Reyna, & Theodore D. Satterthwaite, Beyond Stereotypes of
Adolescent Risk Taking: Placing the Adolescent Brain in Developmental Context, 27 DEv.
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 19, 23 (2017) (comparing "rational" risk taking of adolescents and

adults, while noting that both age groups engage in risk-benefit analysis).
179 Kovens v. Goodwich (In re Goodwich), 517 B.R. 572 (Bankr. D. Md. 2014). See also
Berman v. Leary (In re Leary), 601 B.R. 307 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2019) (judgment owed by debtor
attorney who convinced others to participate in Ponzi scheme through knowingly fraudulent

statements regarding existence of company in good standing with the state and falsified
information about the investment nondischargeable because judgment could be traced to fraud,
even if debtor did not directly receive the fraudulent investment).
180
Goodwich, 517 B.R. at 576.
181

Id. at 577-79.

WHEN ISA DEBT "OBTAINED BY" FRAUD?

2022]

413

invested in prior concerts.182 The court also believed testimony that Goodwich
"bragged to Kovens" about profits received from prior concerts, even providing
183
financial statements on the profits from those shows. Goodwich's fraud did
not personally benefit him, either directly or indirectly;" rather, it benefitted
Glorioso's fraudulent scheme. Nonetheless, Goodwich's false statements
1 85
constituted a fraud that led to Kovens' investment in that fraudulent scheme.
But for Goodwich's fraud, Kovens would not have invested, and Goodwich
would not have faced liability. Accordingly, the court denied discharge of the
debt, holding that § 523(a)(2) requires only that the debtor's fraud caused the
creditor to part with value that in turn led to the creditor's damages, not that the
debtor benefitted personally from that fraud. It focused on protecting the
186
creditors deceived by the fraud, not just punishing those who benefit from it.
187
Thus, the debt owed constituted non-dischargeable fraud debt.
The broad construction of the "obtained by" language from the Supreme
Court and the lack of a Code requirement of benefit by the debtor justifies the
result in Kovens, Rountree, and Thompson. While it is unlikely that a debtor will
engage in fraud without the hope of receiving any direct or indirect benefit, if the
debtor does so, each nondischargeability element exists. The debtor's fraud
caused the loss of creditor value and, thus, the damages and should be
nondischargeable. Such a result comports with the goals of § 523(a)(2)(A)
because it punishes debtors who engage in wrongful acts and protects the victims
of the debtor's fraud.

C. Cases in Which the DebtorDoes Not Perpetratethe Fraudbut Is

182

Id. at 578.

183

Id. at 579.

18

The court noted, however, that Goodwich did not benefit because Glorioso committed fraud

against Goodwich. Goodwich believed that he would also financially benefit from the investments
because he expected to receive 20% of the profits from the concert in which he convinced Kovens
to invest. The court decided that

It is possible that Goodwich . . . was unaware that he was being defrauded by
Glorioso. Goodwich's state of mind ... is not relevant to the outcome here....
He was eager to induce his friend to invest ... Goodwich presented what was

either unverified information or definitively false information . . . in an effort
to induce him. . . ."
Id. at 589.
185

Id. at 588.

186

Id. at 586 (citing Nunnery v. Rountree (In re Rountree), 478 F.3d 215, 219-20 (4th Cir.

2007)).
Id. at 592. The court also determined that the debt qualified for nondischargeability under §
523(a)(2)(B) as a written fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. at 590-92.

187
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Subject to Vicarious Liability
1.

Partnership and Agency

A debtor is more likely to face liability for fraud without receiving any
benefit from that fraud when the debtor's liability arises from vicarious liability
for another's fraud, such as occurs in the partnership context. Every Circuit Court
case involving a partner seeking discharge of imputed fraud liability based on his
or her partner's actual fraud held that the liability cannot be discharged. Though,
in most cases, the court did not need to consider the receipt of benefits issue.' 88
In BancBoston Mortgage Corporation v. Ledford,1 89 the bank loaned
funds to a partnership relying on fraudulent misrepresentations by Ledford.
Ledford's partner, Sikes, did not participate in or know of the fraud.1 90 Agency
and partnership laws hold even a non-defrauding general partner responsible for
the partnership's liabilities. As a result, Sikes faced liability for the fraudulent
actions of his partner and the resulting debt owed to the bank. The court phrased
this inquiry as a question of whether "fraud of one partner can be imputed to
another partner who had no actual knowledge of it."1 9' Noting a Fifth Circuit
decision on a similar case,' 92 and specifically noting that "Sikes shared in the
monetary benefits of the fraud" because the money obtained "[was] used for
partnership purposes," the court held Sikes' debt to the bank nondischargeable.1 93

188
In re Luce, 960 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1992) (specifically noting that debtor received an
indirect benefit through the partnership); BancBoston Mortg. Corp. v. Ledford (In re Ledford), 970
F.2d 1556 (6th Cir.1992) (specifically noting that debtor received an indirect benefit through the
partnership); Deodati v. M.M. Winkler & Assocs. (In re MM. Wrinkler & Assocs.), 239 F.3d 746
(5th Cir. 2001) (specifically rejecting the receipt of benefits test in imputed fraud
nondischargeability case). The court in In re M.M. Winkler & Assocs. noted that in most partnership
imputed liability cases, the debtor will indirectly benefit from the partner's fraud, thus rendering

the issue of whether receipt of benefits must occur moot: "Luce, therefore, stands at least for the
proposition that where a partner's fraud benefits the partnership, all other partners necessarily
receive a benefit from the fraud." In re M.M. Winkler & Assocs., 239 F.3d at 750. Thus, the "receipt
of benefits" test fails to provide a middle ground between absolute refusal to discharge fraud debt
and discharge of truly innocent partners because the innocent partner almost always receives some
benefit from the fraud, even if only a minor one.

189

In re Ledford, 970 F.2d at 1556. This case, and others cited in this section, were the basis

for the court's findings in the In re Bilzerian case. See supra note 145. The factual scenarios were
different, but Bilzerian cited them as the basis of the receipt of benefits test.

190

In re Ledford, 970 F.2d at 1558.

191

Id. at 1561.
192
In re Luce, 960 F.2d at 1282 (finding that debtor "shared in the monetary benefits" of her
partner's fraudulent behavior). But see In re M.M. Winkler & Assocs., 239 F.3d at 750 (arguing

that In re Luce Court did not address the issue of whether receipt of benefits was required because
debtor clearly benefitted from spouse's fraud).
193 In re Ledford, 970 F.2d at 1561. The court also cited an 1885 Supreme Court opinion in
which the non-defrauding partner faced liability for the fraud and "received the fruits of the
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As one court noted, "a majority of courts have adopted the reasoning ... to
impute the wrongful conduct of one party to an innocent debtor for purposes of
nondischargeability."1 94
While the Ledford case noted that the partner benefitted personally from
the fraud, at least one Circuit Court specifically declined to require personal
benefit to the debtor as a result of fraud.1 95 In In re M.M. Winkler & Assocs.,
three parties formed a partnership, and Deodati contracted with the partnership
to engage in business dealings.1 96 Unfortunately, one of the partners fraudulently
stole Deodati's funds; the other partners neither participated in nor benefitted
from the fraud. Under state law, all partners faced liability for the fraud. The nondefrauding partners filed for bankruptcy protection and argued for discharge of
97
the fraud debt because of their lack of role in and benefit from the fraud.1 In
98
making its determination, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals1 focused on the
statutory language of § 523(a)(2)(A), which merely requires that a debt be for
money or value "obtained by" fraud, not that the debtor benefitted from that
fraud.19' It further looked to two Supreme Court cases to justify its holding. The
first, which considered a similar issue under the Bankruptcy Act, referenced the
benefit received by the debtor but found that under that case, "benefit to an
innocent partner is an aggravating factor and not a requirement."200 The second

fraudulent conduct," thus allowing nondischargeability. Id. at 1561-62 (citing Strang v. Bradner,

114 U.S. 555 (1885)).
194 Palilla v. Palilla (In re Palilla), 493 B.R. 248, 254 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2013). For a more
thorough discussion of discharge of imputed fraud liability, see Theresa J. Pulley Radwan,
Determining Congressional Intent Regarding Dischargeability of Imputed Fraud Debts in
Bankruptcy, 54 MERCER L. REV. 987 (2003) (arguing for Congressional intent to allow discharge
for debtors whose fraud liability comes only as a result of imputed liability within partnership
context).
195 See, e.g., In re Palilla,493 B.R. at 256 (citing In re M.M. Winkler & Assocs., 239 F.3d at
749; Nat'l Dev. Servs., Inc. v. Denbleyker (In re Denbleyker), 251 B.R. 891 (Bankr. D. Colo.

2000)).
196 In re M.M. Winkler & Assocs., 239 F.3d at 748.
197

Id.

198

The Fifth Circuit later extended its holding to cover a situation in which an agent defrauded
&

a third party, and a principal could not discharge his liability for the agent's fraud. Tummel

Carroll v. Quinlivan (In re Quinlivan), 434 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2005) (remanding for a determination
of the extent of the principal-agency relationship). See also Villa v. Villa (In re Villa), 261 F.3d
1148, 1151 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that "a debt may be excepted from discharge when ... such
actual fraud is imputed to the debtor under agency principles" but declining to extend outside of

agency relationship).

199

In re M.M. Winkler & Assocs., 239 F.3d at 748-49.

200

Id. at 749 (citing Strang v. Bradner, 114 U.S. 555 (1885)). As one Court noted, that

seemingly violates the idea of providing a fresh start to an honest debtor:
The Court acknowledges the unfairness of this result. It is often said the
discharge is reserved for the honest-but-unfortunate debtor, thus implying that

the purpose of § 523 is to punish only the less-than-honest debtor... . While

the Court sympathizes with Debtor's unfortunate position, granting a discharge
is not solely about an honest debtor's fresh start.... § 523 also has
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was the more recent Cohen case, where the court discussed the case as filling
"that gap" in which the debtor does not actually benefit from the partner's
fraudulent act.20' Importantly, the court phrases the issue as one of whether to
require a "receipt of benefit" in order to find nondischargeability of the fraud
debt. 20 2
These cases involve debt directly caused by the fraud, and the cases
generally agree with the Supreme Court's broad interpretation that
nondischargeability simply requires a causal connection between fraudulent
activity and the existence or continuation of the debt. However, it is difficult to
reconcile the broad causal analysis and lack of benefit requirement in these
imputed-liability cases with the requirement of some benefit to the debtor from
the debtor's own fraud. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence answers neither
scenario because those cases only establish the "but for" causal link requirement
between the fraud and the harm but do not clearly indicate whether the debtor
must engage in the fraud or whether the debtor must benefit from that harm.
Outside of the partnership context, imputed fraud liability has a less
consistent result. In re Huh 203 involved a debtor facing liability for his
employee's fraudulent actions. 2 4 The bankruptcy court did not find fraud
sufficient to hold Huh directly liable for the fraud; rather, his liability arose as
the principal operating through his employee-agent. As a result, "the bankruptcy
court declined to impute [the employee's] fraud to Huh." 20 5 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP") outlined five elements to be met to
establish fraud nondischargeability, including "knowledge of the falsity or
deceptiveness of such representation(s) or omission(s)" and "intent to
deceive." 206 The BAP ultimately adopted a knowledge-based approach, requiring
that for a debtor to be denied discharge based on imputed fraud liability, the
debtor must have known or should have known of the fraud. 207 The case focused
less on the causation and more on the basic elements of fraud.

compensatory objectives which aim to protect certain types of creditors

regardless of the debtor's culpability.
In re Palilla, 493 B.R. at 257 (citing Lawrence Ponoroff, Vicarious Thrills: The Case for
Application of Agency Rules in Bankruptcy DischargeabilityLitigation, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2515
(1996)).
201
In re M.M. Winkler & Assocs., 239 F.3d at 750.
202
Id. at 749.
203
Sachan v. Huh (In re Huh), 506 B.R. 257 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015).
204
Id. at 259-61.
205

Id. at 261.

206

Id. at 262 (also including misrepresentation, justifiable reliance, and damage "proximately
caused" by reliance on the misrepresentation).
207
Id. at 265-66 (citing Walker v. Citizens State Bank (In re Walker), 726 F.2d 452 (8th Cir.
1984)).
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Another situation in which the debtor might not be the one engaging in
20
fraud comes in the constructive fraud context. In McClellan v. Cantrell, s the
primary issue presented to the court involved whether a participant in
constructive fraud can discharge the amount due as a result of that fraud. Cantrell,
the debtor, purchased machinery from her brother for a fraction of the
machinery's value. 2o Unfortunately, the brother defaulted on a loan to
McClellan secured by the machinery. 210 The sale occurred shortly after
McClellan sought an injunction on the machinery's sale and with the debtor's
knowledge of McClellan's injunction motion. The bankruptcy court determined
that nondischargeability required an affirmative misrepresentation by the
debtor.2 "' The McClellan Court disagreed, holding that because the debtor's
brother engaged in actual fraud, and the debtor knowingly received the benefit
2 12
of that fraud, nondischargeability applied to the debt. In so holding, the court
focused on the purpose of the nondischargeability provision-preventing fraud
2 13
The court also distinguished
and providing a remedy to defrauded creditors.
actual fraud from constructive fraud, in which the recipient takes property for
less than reasonably equivalent value but does so honestly. Such a situation
would not serve as the basis for nondischargeability, both due to the lack of
culpability of the debtor and the lack of connection between any fraud by the
214
debtor and receipt of money that creates a repayment obligation.
Both constructive fraud and imputed fraud liability in the partnership
context involve a debtor who did not engage in fraudulent behavior with any
malintent, but in the constructive fraud situation, the debtor always benefits by
receipt of something for which the debtor did not pay full value. 15 By contrast,

McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 892. The debtor purchased the machinery for the stated price of $10 and sold it for
$160,000. Id.
208

209

210

Id. McClellan attached on the security interest but failed to perfect the interest before the
debtor purchased the machinery. Id. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the buyer of machinery
takes priority over an unperfected security interest in machinery as long as the buyer lacks
knowledge of the existence of the creditor's interest in the property. U.C.C. § 9-317(b) (AM. L.
INST.

2001). Whether the debtor purchased the machines from her brother knowing of the existence

of McClellan's security interest then dictated whether the debtor took the property subject to

McClellan's interest in it. See McClellan, 217 F.3d at 897-98 (J. Ripple, concurring) (considering
whether debtor's actions constituted willful and malicious injury for nondischargeability under §
523(a)(6)).
211
McClellan, 217 F.3d at 892.
212
Id. at 894.
213
Id. at 893.
214
215

Id. at 894.
See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 548(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (West 2021) (constructive fraud occurs when debtor

transfers property to another for "less than reasonably equivalent value" while insolvent); UNIF.
VOIDABLE TRANSFERS ACT § 4(a)(2) (2014) (providing for recovery by a creditor of transfers made
by debtor for less than reasonably equivalent value while insolvent).

418

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 124

no such guaranty of benefit exists in the imputed-fraud context. 216 Thus, to the
extent that a partner's imputed fraud liability can be declared nondischargeable,
even if the partner did not benefit from the fraud, no justification exists for
allowing discharge in the constructive fraud context simply because the
transferee acted in good faith.
The fact that partners who did not engage in fraud are more likely to face
nondischargeability of their imputed fraud liability contravenes the clear
bankruptcy policy of providing discharge to the "honest but unfortunate"
debtor.217 It seems impossible that a debtor who actually engages in fraud might
be allowed to discharge that debt if the debtor did not actually benefit from the
fraud2 8 or that a debtor who perpetuates or the benefactor who receives property
as a result of constructive fraud might be entitled to discharge absent knowledge
of the fraud, 2 19 while denying discharge to the innocent partner who might
incidentally benefit from the partner's fraud 220 (and, in cases like In re M.M.
Winkler & Assocs.,221 even if the partner received no benefit from the fraud).
A close reading of § 523(a)(2)(A) suggests that a debtor need not benefit from
the fraud, nor even know of the fraud, in order to be liable. The language prevents
the discharge of "any debt . .. for money, property, services, or an extension,
renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by" fraud. In both the
situation in which the debtor engaged in fraud but received no benefit from the
fraud and the situation in which fraud liability is imputed to a partner or a
principal, property was obtained by the perpetrator of the fraud through that fraud
and the debtor's liability ensued as a result of that fraudulent action. In short, but
for the fraud, the debtor's debt would not exist. Nothing in the Code requires that
the debtor benefit from that fraud-directly or indirectly. And nothing in the
Code requires that the debtor perpetrate that fraud, or even that the debtor knew
or should have known of the fraud. As noted by the Supreme Court,222 it merely
requires that the debt be tied to fraud that caused the creditor to relinquish

216
Deodati v. M.M. Winkler & Assocs. (In re M.M. Wrinkler & Assocs.), 239 F.3d 746 (5th
Cir. 2001).
217
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365 (2007) ("The principal purpose of the

Bankruptcy Code is to grant a 'fresh start' to the 'honest but unfortunate debtor."' (quoting Grogan

v. Garner, 489 U.S. 279 (1991)).
218
HSSM #7 Ltd. P'ship v. Bilzerian (In re Bilzerian), 100 F.3d 886 (11th Cir. 1996); Nunnery
v. Rountree (In re Rountree), 478 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 2007).
219
McClellan, 217 F.3d at 894 (noting the possibility that recipient of a constructively
fraudulent transfer would be able to discharge resulting debt) (dictum).
220
See supra note 188 (noting consensus among Circuit Courts dealing with discharge of
imputed fraud liability of partners).
221
Deodati v. M.M. Winkler & Assocs. (In re M.M. Winkler & Assocs.), 239 F.3d 746 (5th
Cir. 2001).
222
See supra Part 111.
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value.223 At the very least, consistency would suggest that if debtors cannot
discharge imputed fraud liability, they should not be allowed to discharge
liability for fraud that they actually perpetrated simply because they did not
personally benefit from that fraud. Such a result would be consistent with the
Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the phrase "to the extent obtained by,"
and with the policy of punishing dishonest debtors. If any persons should be able
to discharge debt that resulted because of fraud, it would only be the truly honest
debtors, such as the partner whose liability comes solely from imputed liability.
V.

CONCLUSION: GOING BEYOND THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS
TO PROMOTE DISCHARGE FOR AN INNOCENT PERSON LIABLE FOR
ANOTHER PARTY'S FRAUD IF THE DEBTOR DID NOT BENEFIT FROM
THE FRAUD

Most cases considering § 523(a)(2)(A)'s "obtained by" language predate
the Supreme Court's decision in Husky, and many predate the Supreme Court's
decisions in Cohen and Archer. Cases coming after some or all of those Supreme
224
The
Court decisions have recognized the broadening impact of each case.
Supreme Court cases discussing the "obtained by" requirement merely create the
causal link required for nondischargeability-the debt would not be owed but for
the fraudulent activity. Each of the cases considered by the Supreme Court
involved situations in which the debtor was seeking to discharge debt perpetrated
and benefitted from the fraud. That guidance translates easily to other situations
in which the debtor engaged in fraud, such as the post-incurrence extension of
the debt. The Court's rulings, the language of the Code, and the subsequent cases
all support a finding that the continued extension of credit harms the creditor
directly as a result of the fraud and creates nondischargeability. But the Court's
decisions should also provide guidance for less clear situations in which the
debtor's fraud does not benefit the debtor, or the debtor did not actually
perpetuate the fraud for which the debtor suffers liability. Most courts
considering the Supreme Court's relatively broad interpretation of the phrase "to
the extent obtained by" have moved toward a standard that does not require that
the debtor benefit from, or even engage in, the fraud for a debt to be
nondischargeable.
Perhaps the most challenging issue involves situations in which the
debtor did not benefit at all from the fraud. In situations where the debtor
perpetrated the fraud, courts differ as to whether nondischargeability requires

223
But see Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Determining Congressional Intent Regarding
Dischargeabilityof Imputed FraudDebts in Bankruptcy, 54 MERCER L. Rev. 987 (2003) (arguing
that, despite the language of the statute, imputed fraud liability should be dischargeable based on

policy and legislative history of § 523(a)(2)(A)). See also supra note 10 (noting that if fraudulent
transfer did not cause creditor to give value to transferor, the transferor's debt lacks the causal

connection to the fraud and, arguably, could be discharged, while the transferee's liability exists
only because of the fraud and would not be dischargeable under a broad reading of Husky).
224

See, e.g., supra notes 154, 201 and accompanying text.
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that the debtor receive some, at least indirect, benefit from the debtor's fraudulent
actions. The Supreme Court's broad holdings suggest that any time that a
debtor's fraud leads to the debtor's liability, the debtor cannot discharge that
liability. Benefit need not be shown, though admittedly, the issue did not arise in
any of the Supreme Court cases.
Despite the lack of a requirement that the debtor perpetuate the fraud in
the Code's language, and the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of §
523(a)(2)(A), courts should be cautious in finding nondischargeable an innocent
debtor's liability for fraud perpetuated by another.22 5 Holding the debt of the
innocent transferee, innocent partner, or innocent principal nondischargeable
undermines one of the goals of nondischargeability-to punish the dishonest
debtor but protect the honest one. The Supreme Court repeatedly recognizes this
goal when punishing a dishonest debtor with nondischargeability. Of course,
protecting the victim of the fraud must also be considered, but courts' discharge
exceptions should be construed narrowly to offer the "honest but unfortunate"
debtor the maximum discharge available. 22 6 The Code, while silent, may suggest
that Congress assumed that the debtor would be the person perpetrating the fraud
upon that creditor, providing some basis for allowing an innocent debtor to
discharge debt for fraud perpetrated by another person.22 7

See also Koha, supra note 11, at Part IV.B.1 (arguing that "the best reading of the plain
language .. . is that the debtor must have obtained money, property, services or credit by fraud").
225

See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991) (citing Local Loan Co.
v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234 (1934)); Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007)
(considering ability of a Chapter 7 debtor who engaged in bad faith activities to convert to a
Chapter 13 case); Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 217, 223 (1998).
226

227

See supra Section II.

